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NOTE
MURKY WATERS:
PRIVATE ACTION AND
THE RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHFUL
ENVIRONMENT
AN EXAMINATION OF CAPE-FRANCE
ENTERPRISES v. ESTATE OF PEED
Chase Naber*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed is only the second
decision given by the Montana Supreme Court regarding
Montana's constitutionally guaranteed right to a clean and
healthful environment.1  The right was first addressed in
Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of
Environmental Quality (MEIC), a case involving a state action
in violation of the constitution.2 Issued not quite two years after
the headline-making decision in MEIC, Cape-France applies the
* J.D. Candidate, University of Montana School of Law, 2003.
1. Cape-France Enters. v. Est. of Peed, 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d
1011.
2. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207,
988 P.2d 1236 (hereafter, MEIC).
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right to a clean and healthful environment to a private action
involving a contract for sale of real property. 3
In its decision, the Cape-France court broke with precedent
in three areas. First, it broke with its long-standing aversion of
addressing the constitutional issues when a case could be
decided on other grounds. Second, when it affirmed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment based on impossibility.
Finally, it broke with the principles of contract law and Montana
precedent when it rescinded the agreement without
substantiated evidence of impossibility. The court also failed to
address the constitutional right to acquire and possess property
and how it should be balanced against the right to a clean and
healthful environment. Moreover, the substantive facts
concerning possible environmental degradation were moot at the
time of the appeal, and the court could have remanded the case
for a decision based on the current facts. The facts of the case
are laid forth in Part II. Part III describes the holding of the
case, Part IV summarizes Montana constitutional law cited by
the court. Part V discusses Montana contract law and
extrajurisdictional cases the court used and misapplied in its
holding, and analyzes what the court should have decided based
on the cases it relied on.
II. FACTS
Respondents Lola H. Peed and Marthe E. Moore (Peed and
Moore) submitted a request for summary judgment in an action
seeking specific performance. 4 They wanted to purchase the
land they had contracted for. The land needed to be subdivided
from a larger parcel, and to do so required a showing of a water
supply. 5 Before Peed and Moore submitted their brief on appeal
to the court, the city of Bozeman extended the municipal water
supply to the land in question, rendering the issue concerning
the well moot.6 The court was made aware the property was
connected to the municipal water supply.7
In July of 1994, Peed, and her granddaughter Moore
executed a Buy-Sell Agreement (Agreement) with Cape-France
Enterprises (Cape-France). The Agreement involved the
3. Cape-France, 37.
4. Cape-France, 1.
5. Id. 6.
6. Appellants' Initial Br. at 20.
7. Id.
Vol. 64358
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purchase approximately five acres of land near what later
became the Wyndham Hotel adjacent to the then unconstructed
19th Street interchange with Interstate 90, northeast of
Bozeman.8 Peed and Moore expressed their intention to build a
hotel with Cape-France. 9 Cape-France obligated itself in the
Agreement to satisfy requirements necessary to ensure proper
rezoning and subdivision permits 10.
Nearly four months after signing the Agreement, the city of
Bozeman sent a letter to Lowell Springer, the engineer retained
by Cape-France to develop the land in compliance with the
rezoning and subdivision requirements." The letter from the
city informed Springer that approval for subdividing Cape-
France's land was conditioned on the establishment of a water
supply to the proposed subdivision.12 Cape-France and Springer
did not drill a well to gain approval for the subdivision as
required by their obligation to establish a subdivision in the
Agreement. 13
In late December of 1995, more than a year had passed and
Cape-France had still not drilled the well. 14 Approximately
eighteen months after the Agreement had been signed, the
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) wrote Springer to
inform him that perchlorethylene (PCE) had been detected in
the aquifer under Bozeman, and that the extent of the
contamination was unknown. 15 The DEQ recommended a pump
test well be drilled on the proposed subdivision site to ascertain
if the contamination plume had already reached the property. 16
The DEQ informed Springer that as a condition of subdivision
approval, any water supply wells drilled on the property would
8. Telephone Interview with Lowell W. Springer, Principal Architect, Springer
Group Architects (Mar. 22, 2002).
9. Resp't. Br. at 3.
10. Id. at 2. The closing date of the Agreement was September 1, 1994, and as that
date approached the proposed plat for the subdivision had not been filed for approval.
Without a filed plat, closing could not occur, and the parties entered into an extension
agreement to postpone closing to no more than ten days past the established completion
of the zoning change and compliance with subdivision laws.
11. Appellants' Initial Br. at 5.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 6-7.
15. The letter warned that water supply wells drilled in the proposed subdivision
may tap contaminated groundwater, and that the legal owners of the subdivision lots
would be liable if pollution resulted from improper well construction or if contaminated
groundwater was pumped into a clean area (Id. at Ex. 4).
16. Id.
2003 359
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have to be sampled annually.'7 When Springer received the
letter, Costco Wholesale had already built on property near the
proposed subdivision and had completed its own supply well
system without encountering the PCE plume.' 8 Both Cape-
France and Springer knew of the plume before Cape-France
signed the Agreement. 19
In October 1998, nearly three years after the DEQ had
written the letter and more than five years after the Agreement
had been signed, Peed and Moore filed a motion for summary
judgment requesting specific performance. Peed and Moore
wanted Cape-France to complete the procedures necessary to
obtain the subdivision permit so they could purchase the five
acre tract.20  Cape-France followed with a cross-motion for
summary judgment in November 1998, requesting rescission of
the Agreement for mutual mistake. 21
Judge Salvagni found for Cape-France in April 1999,
concluding that mutual mistake made it impossible for Cape-
France to "proceed without exposing itself to a huge risk."22
Peed and Moore appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana.
III. HOLDING
Justice Nelson, writing for the majority, affirmed the lower
court and rescinded the Agreement. 23 The issue on appeal was
whether the district court was correct in holding the Agreement
unenforceable on grounds of impossibility, and in refusing to
order specific performance. 24 Montana's highest court found
Cape-France could not fulfill the Agreement without exposing
"itself, not only to substantial and unbargained-for economic
risks but, as well, the public would be exposed to potential
health risks and possible environmental degradation. '25
Therefore, the Agreement was, "most importantly, not in accord
with the guarantees and mandates of Montana's Constitution,
Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1."26
17. Id.
18. Appellants' Initial Br. at 9-10; Ex.7 at 38 [France Dep.].
19. Appellants' Initial Br. Ex.7 at 63-64 [ France Dep.].
20. Appellants' Initial Br. at 18.
21. Id.
22. Appellants' Initial Br. Ex. 1.
23. Cape-France, 1 1.
24. Id. 9[ 3.
25. Id.y[ 29.
26. Id. 37. Article II, Section 3 reads: Inalienable rights. All persons are born
360 Vol. 64
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The court cited Montana precedent dealing with
impossibility and impracticability of fulfillment of contract
obligations, and turned to secondary sources and
extrajurisdictional cases to build its finding for Cape-France.
The court finished its holding with an analysis of the potential
violation of Montana's constitutional right to a clean and
healthful environment if specific performance was ordered. The
court's decision overturned Montana precedent concerning
impossibility because Cape-France did not substantiate evidence
to show impossibility. Justice Leaphart wrote a concurring
opinion, restating the court's long-standing precedent of
"avoid[ing] constitutional issues wherever possible," and that he
would choose to resolve the case following that precedent. 27
Justice Rice28 and Chief Justice Gray29 filed dissenting opinions.
free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful
environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending
their lives and liberties, acquiring and possessing and protecting property, and seeking
their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all
persons recognize corresponding responsibilities. Article IX, Section 1 states: The state
and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in
Montana for present and future generations.
27. Cape-France, 41.
28. Id. 42-64. Justice Rice wrote, in pertinent part,
In my view the majority misapplies the contract doctrine of impossibility and
impracticability. Moreover, I believe this case can and should be resolved
without reaching the constitutional issues-and without the sweeping
constitutional holding-reached by the majority....This case can be resolved on
the contract issues alone, consistent with this Court's long tradition of
declining to address constitutional issues where it is unnecessary .... While the
majority discusses the inalienable right to a clean and healthful environment
contained in Article II, Section 3, the Court fails to even mention, in a case
about acquiring property, the co-existent inalienable right of our people
contained in Article II, Section 3, to acquire, possess and protect
property .... The decision leaves important questions unanswered. How
certain must the potential be before the contract is deemed to have an unlawful
purpose? How is a contract's potential adverse impact on the environment to
be measured? How significant must that potential impact be?.. .Is a notice
from the State that there may be a pollution issue affecting a parcel of property
sufficient enough to prohibit use of the property? While future decisions of the
Court may eventually resolve such questions, far too much is today left in
doubt .... I would order a remand of this case, and after the material facts are
established, the contract and constitutional principles at issue here could be
properly adjudicated.
29. Id. 65-76. Chief Justice Gray wrote, in pertinent part,
I respectfully dissent from the result the Court reaches in this case, from its
analysis and application of the law regarding impossibility of performance, and
from the inclusion it its opinion of constitutional issues not before us .... Both
courts also overlook the fact that the Buy Sell Agreement places responsibility
for getting the subject property through subdivision requirements and
approval on Cape-France, and that the test well was merely one remaining
5
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IV. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Constitutional Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment
The Cape-France court discussed the violation of the
Montana Constitution that would occur if specific performance
were granted. The court cited MEIC and its analysis of Article
II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.30 Many of the conclusions
made in MEIC were held to be relevant only to the facts of
MEIC, but the following language was not:
We conclude, based on the eloquent record of the Montana
Constitutional Convention that to give effect to the rights
guaranteed by Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 of the
Montana Constitution they must be read together and
consideration given to all of the provisions of Article IX, Section 1,
as well as the preamble to the Montana Constitution. In doing so,
we conclude that the delegates' intention was to provide language
and protections which are both anticipatory and preventative. 3 1
In MEIC, the plaintiffs brought an action against the state
DEQ for allowing environmental degradation in contravention of
the constitution. The lower court found the plaintiffs could not
substantiate evidence of environmental injury and held for the
defendant. 32
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued the statute in question did
not allow for analysis of how a discharge might degrade water
quality, and therefore did not meet the constitutional
requirement of Article IX, Section 1, to maintain and improve a
item-arguably capable of performance and certainly not unlawful-in that
process .... Finally with regard to the constitutional issues discussed in the
Court's opinion, I agree with Justice Leaphart that we follow the long-standing
and important principle that courts should avoid constitutional issues
wherever possible ... Consequently, I strenuously dissent from the Court's
insertion-and resolution, on its own and without full briefing-of a
nonexistent constitutional issue into this case .... To that extent, the
discussion is dicta in its entirety and, as a result, not controlling precedent.
The problem is that dicta takes on a life of its own. The bigger problem is that
the Montana constitutional rights relating to the environment are hugely
important and impactful to the citizens of Montana and should not be dallied
with by this Court in the absence of issues being raised in the District Court
and fully briefed in this Court. For the reasons stated above, I dissent from the
Court's opinion on the issue actually before us and strenuously dissent from its
inappropriate insertion of the 'clean and healthful' discussion, which will
unnecessarily fan the flames of controversy in Montana.
30. MEIC, 47.
31. Id. T 77.
32. Id. T 35.
6
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clean and healthful environment. 33 The court held for the
plaintiffs, concluding that any statute or rule which implicated
the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment
would be subject to strict scrutiny, and could survive only if
justified by a compelling state interest.34 The court further held
it would apply strict scrutiny to both state and private action.35
Chief Justice Turnage, and Justices Leaphart and Gray
submitted specially concurring opinions, splitting the court on
the issue of the application of strict scrutiny to private action.36
Justice Gray joined Chief Justice Turnage and Justice Leaphart
only in that she would not have addressed private action in the
MEIC holding.3 7  The special concurrence of Chief Justice
Turnage and Justice Leaphart also suggested that applying
strict scrutiny analysis to private action might prove
unworkable in the future:
As we state in this opinion, strict scrutiny analysis requires that
the state demonstrate a compelling state interest and that its
action is both closely tailored to effectuate that interest and the
least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the State's
objective. I am not clear as to how, or whether, private action
lends itself to a 'compelling state interest' analysis. 38
The dissenting Justices were well founded in their
apprehension surrounding the treatment of private action. The
MEIC court held "that for the purposes of the facts presented in
this case, § 75-5-303, MCA is a reasonable legislative
implementation of the mandate provided for in Article IX,
Section 1,"39 but that it violated the constitution to the extent it "
arbitrarily excludes certain 'activities' from nondegradation
review without regard to the nature or volume of the substances
being discharged."40
Section 75-5-303 is the umbrella rule for water quality
protection and allows for exemptions provided in MCA § 75-5-
317. Subparts (3) and (3)(b) of§ 75-5-303 state:
The department may not authorize degradation of high-quality
waters unless it has been affirmatively demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence to the department that: the
33. Id. 50.
34. Id. 63.
35. MEIC, 64.
36. Id. 83.
37. Id. T 86.
38. Id. 1 83.
39. Id.
40. Id. 80.
2003 363
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proposed project will result in important economic or social
development and that the benefit of the development exceeds the
costs to society of allowing degradation of high-quality waters.
One analysis summarized the decision this way:
Thus, while the Court in MEIC concluded that the environmental
rights in Montana's 1972 Constitution are fundamental and that they
create enforceable limits at least on legislative action, the Court has also
held that these rights are subject to a balancing against other, important
public values such as economic and social development. As with other
fundamental rights, they are subject to infringement in appropriate
circumstances. The Court's endorsement of § 75-5-303 indicates economic
and social developments are among the values to be balanced against
these environmental rights.
4 1
Unfortunately, the MEIC court did not provide clear
guidance regarding the balance of economic and social
development against the right to a clean and healthful
environment. In Cape-France, the court again failed to address
how to balance right to a clean and healthful environment
against private economic and social development.
B. Application in Cape-France
The court failed to address a key distinguishing factor
between MEIC and Cape-France. In MEIC, environmental
degradation was substantiated by science and numbers; in Cape-
France, plaintiffs were granted summary judgment based only
on the assertion of potential environmental risk. The Cape-
France holding suggests the court has decided there will be no
forthright balancing between environmental degradation and
economic and social developments. The court did not address
how to balance between two constitutionally guaranteed rights
in conflict such as the right to a clean and healthful
environment and the right to acquire and possess property, also
listed in Article II, Section 3.
In Cape-France, the DEQ advised Springer that all wells
drilled on the property would be tested annually as a condition
of subdivision approval.42 The DEQ intended to test the wells
for contaminants because it has policies for closing wells with an
unacceptable contaminant level.43  Annual review of
41. John L. Horwich, MEIC v. DEQ: An Inadequate Effort to Address the Meaning
of Montana's Constitutional Environmental Provisions, 62 MONT. L. REV. 269, 298
(2001).
42. Appellants' Initial Br., Ex.4.
43. Telephone Interview with Cindy Brooks, Staff Attorney, Montana DEQ (Mar.
364 Vol. 64
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contaminant levels by the DEQ in Cape-France should have
satisfied the MEIC court's holding that the statute in MEIC
violated the constitution to the extent it exempted certain
contaminant discharge from review.
In MEIC, the court held that § 75-5-317(2)(j) was
unconstitutional because it does not review certain types of
degradation of the environment by the discharge of
contaminants. 44 The MEIC court stated that the protection
afforded the environment is to be both anticipatory and
preventative and strict scrutiny must be applied to both state
and private actions that infringe on the right to a clean and
healthful environment. 45  The MEIC court also held that
degradation subject to scientific analysis must be balanced
against other values such as economic and social development.
46
The DEQ annually reviews potential contamination sites to
determine if they need to be closed for unacceptable levels.
47
The MEIC court held that § 75-10-303 is constitutional although
it permits degradation for valuable social and economic
developments. The Cape-France court needed to compare and
analyze its holding in MEIC to clarify why annual review of
contaminant levels in Cape-France was deficient, although
degradation is allowed for valuable social and economic
developments.
By neglecting to provide adequate analysis in Cape-France,
the court left Montanans without parameters to design
endeavors that will pass constitutional muster. Many issues in
a contract for real property could be tied to degradation of the
environment: digging wells, clearing trees, moving earth,
making roads. The court's opinion in Cape-France did not limit
the abuse that could arise from parties wishing to rescind
contracts.
The court affirmed the lower court's assessment that the
Agreement exposed the public to "potential health risks" and
"potential environmental degradation".48 The terms themselves
are nebulous at best, and the court did nothing to clarify them.
Furthermore, the court ignored Article IX, Section 1, subsections
2 and 3 when it cited the 'pertinent' part of the Article as being
22, 2002).
44. MEIC, $ 80.
45. Id. [ 77.
46. Id. 13 7.
47. Id.
48. Cape-France, [ 29.
2003 365
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the duty to maintain and improve a clean and healthful
environment. Subsections 2 and 3 provide the legislature with
the duty to enforce the improvement and maintenance of the
environment.49
The legislature must utilize and clarify its enforcement
mandate. Allowing the court to determine the constitutionality
of property transactions involving possible degradation has
created uncertainty. When the court ignored its precedent and
unnecessarily addressed the constitutionality of the Agreement,
it created questions surrounding the balancing of rights and left
them unanswered. The people of Montana must clarify, through
consensus, the bounds of tolerable environmental degradation.
Anything less will murk the rights and responsibilities provided
by the constitution.
V. CASE LAW
A. Montana Precedent
The court cited three Montana cases in its discussion of the
doctrine of impossibility. The first two, Barrett v. Ballard5 ° and
360 Ranch Corp. v. R & D Holding51 it gave cursory mention to.
The court focused on the earlier case of Smith v. Zepp 52 and its
quote from the Restatement of Contracts, § 454: "Impossibility
encompasses 'not only strict impossibility but impracticability
because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury
or loss involved."'5 3
In Smith, the defendants purchased the plaintiffs mining
properties, and as part of the contract, agreed to pay the
plaintiffs a monthly fee of 15% of the net profits. To ensure
maximization of the plaintiffs fee, the defendants agreed to
produce a daily average of 300 yards of mined material for gold
processing. The defendants failed to mine the contractually
required amount, and the plaintiffs filed suit against them for
breach. The defendants argued that impossibility excused their
failure to perform. They alleged they were unable to obtain the
equipment needed to remove the required daily quantity, and
what earth they had mined in a month had produced only one
49. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1, cls. 2, 3.
50. Barrett v. Ballard, 191 Mont. 39, 622 P.2d 180 (1980).
51. 360 Ranch Corp. v. R & D Holding 278 Mont. 487, 926 P.2d 260 (1996).
52. Smith v. Zepp, 173 Mont. 358, 567 P.2d 923 (1977).
53. Id. at 364, 567 P.2d at 927.
366 Vol. 64
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unprofitable ounce. The lower court found for the plaintiffs. 54
The defendants appealed to the Montana Supreme Court which
affirmed long-standing precedent when it held "[d]efendants are
not excused from breaching their contractual duty to mine 300
yards of material daily."55
The Cape-France court's reliance on the one-sentence quote
of the Restatement it cited in Smith is contrary to its
application. Smith indeed quoted the Restatement of Contracts,
§ 454.56 However, Smith also cited § 460,57 and held the
defendants had the duty to prove the thing they contracted to do
was impossible, as the party requesting excuse for failure to
perform on grounds of impracticability creating impossibility.
The court admonished the defendants for not bringing a single
expert witness to testify to the truth of their claim.
[D]efendants presented no expert testimony to establish that
production of merely 30-40 yards of material per day for one
month was conclusive evidence that substantial quantities of gold
did not exist on the property. Defendants did not introduce any
evidence of geologists' or geophysicists' reports as to the minerals
contained in the land.58
In addition to its reliance on the Restatement, the Smith
court relied on two Montana cases to support its finding. Smith
first cited to Brown v. First Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n,59 for
the general rule that contract obligations must be performed
according to contract terms.60 Smith also cited Hein v. Fox:
Courts can give no solace where parties to a contract find
themselves minus expected profit through failure to exercise care
in drawing up such contract. What this court said in Hinerman v.
Baldwin, 67 Mont. 417, 433, 215 P. 1103, 1108, well applies here,
viz: '***The court has no right to make a contract for the parties
different from that actually entered into by them.*** "Whether the
plaintiff made a good or a bad bargain is of no concern to the
court.***Merely because the terms of the contract now appear
unreasonable or burdensome affords no reason to permit him to
54. Id. at 360, 567 P.2d at 924.
55. Id. at 367, 567 P.2d at 928.
56. Id. at 364, 567 P.2d at 927.
57. Id. at 365, 567 P.2d at 927.
Where the existence of a specific thing ***is, either by the terms of a bargain or
in the contemplation of both parties, necessary for the performance of a
promise in the bargain, a duty to perform the promise (a) never arises if at the
time the bargain is made the existence of the thing *** within the time for
seasonable performance is impossible***.
58. Id.
59. Brown v. First Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 154 Mont. 79, 460 P.2d 97 (1934).
60. Smith, 173 Mont. at 370, 567 P.2d at 929.
2003 367
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avoid his contract.".*** "The duty of the court is to enforce
contracts, not to make new ones for the parties, however unwise
the terms may appear."
6 1
Smith fortified precedent established as early as 1923,
obligating promisors to fulfill their promises, no matter how
weak the decision-making was in formulating the promise. The
Smith court held the defendants liable for damages equal to the
percentage owed the plaintiffs, had the defendants fulfilled the
contract and mined 300 yards of material daily from the day the
mine was ready for production, plus interest.62
The Cape-France court also cites Barrett v. Ballard.63 The
Barrett court was unclear why the defendant, Mrs. Ballard, was
claiming it was impossible to perform the contract to pay her
real estate agent, Ms. Barrett.64  The court concluded,
"Impossibility of performance is a strict standard that can only
be maintained where the circumstances truly dictate
impossibility. '65
360 Ranch is relied on in Cape-France for the general rule
that parties must be held to the terms of their contracts.66 The
360 Ranch court concluded that a lower court should rarely
grant summary judgment based on impossibility:
There will, undoubtedly, be contract cases in which a district court
could grant summary judgment based on impossibility of
performance. For example, where an Act of God physically
destroys the subject matter of a contract, or where the subject
matter of a contract is subsequently declared illegal, then it could
be held that, as a matter of law performance of the contract was
impossible. In many other cases, however, whether performance of
a contract was impossible will be a question of fact, and summary
judgment will not be appropriate. 67
In 360 Ranch, the plaintiff ranch sought summary judgment
on its request for declaratory relief, based on the parties' intent
and impossibility of compliance with the contract terms. The
ranch sold a five-acre parcel of land to the defendant, but could
not get proper subdivision approval before the closing date of the
agreement. It gave title to 20 acres to the defendant to prevent
breach, and entered an option to reclaim the 15 acres if the
61. Hein v. Fox,126 Mont. 514, 520, 254 P.2d 1076, 1079 (1953). [punctuation from
the original].
62. Smith, 173 Mont. at 370, 567 P.2d at 929.
63. Barrett, 191 Mont. 39, 622 P.2d 180 (1980).
64. Id. at 44, 622 P.2d at 184.
65. Id.
66. Cape-France, 17.
67. 360 Ranch, 278 Mont. at 493, 926 P.2d at 263.
368 Vol. 64
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subdivision was created within a year from closing. The ranch
failed to obtain the subdivision in time.
The lower court found that conflicts between the Bozeman
Area Master Plan and the Bozeman Area Zoning Ordinance
made the plaintiffs efforts to subdivide impossible and granted
summary judgment for the ranch.68 On appeal, the court
reversed and remanded, holding summary judgment was
inappropriate in light of genuine issues of material fact
concerning the impossibility of compliance with the contract
terms. 69
B. Extrajurisdictional Cases
As it did with its use of Smith, the Cape-France court aptly
quoted Opera Co. of Boston v. Wolf Trap Foundation. 70
However, while the court cited to Opera for language suggesting
that the definitions of impossibility and impracticability have
become synonymous, 71 it ignored the application of the doctrine
in Opera. In Opera, the lower court found the defendant open-
air theater in breach. The theater had not provided a sufficient
contingency lighting system, and when an electrical storm
caused an outage of the main power supply, the plaintiffs
performance had to be cancelled. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals remanded the case for findings surrounding the
theater's claim of impossibility. It summarized the law this
way:
[A] party relying on the defense of impossibility of performance
must establish (1) the unexpected occurrence of an intervening
act, (2) such occurrence was of such a character that its non-
occurrence was a basic assumption of the agreement of the parties,
and (3) that occurrence made performance impracticable. When
all those facts are established the defense is made out.72
In its decision to expand impossibility to include
impracticability, specifically supervening impracticability, the
Cape-France court cited the decision of Bissell v. L.W. Edison
Company.73 In Bissell, the Michigan Appeals Court cited § 261
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), which excuses
performance upon occurrence of a supervening event that
68. 360 Ranch, 278 Mont. at 490, 926 P.2d at 262.
69. 360 Ranch, 278 Mont. at 493, 926 P.2d at 263.
70. Opera Co. of Boston v. Wolf Trap Foundation, 817 F.2d 1094 (4th Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 1098.
72. Id. at 1102.
73. Bissell v. L. W. Edison Co., 156 N.W.2d 623 (Mich. App. 1968).
2003 369
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renders fulfillment of the contract impracticable. 74  The
Michigan Appeals Court determined the plaintiffs contractual
duties were properly discharged by the lower court because of
impossibility due to a supervening event. 75
The plaintiff contracted to obtain fill from a river bed and
place it as the base of a highway approach.76 The defendant had
pre-contractual knowledge that the highway department
intended to place a water main in the right-of-way of the
plaintiffs fill-extraction site during the time the plaintiff had
contracted to complete work for the defendant. 77 The defendant
did not share his knowledge of the highway department's plans
with the plaintiff.78 The water main froze and burst, freezing
the plaintiffs hydraulic dredge, and causing him to be unable to
fulfill his contractual obligations. 79 The Michigan Appeals Court
held that if the plaintiff had been made aware of the
supervening event before entering into the contract, he could
have declined to make the contract, or charged more to cover the
risk of not being able to fulfill his duties as required.80
C. The Misapplication of Precedent and Extrajurisdictional Case
Law to Cape-France
The Cape-France court extracted language from the
aforementioned cases to justify upholding a grant of summary
judgment for Cape-France. However, the holdings of the cases
do not justify upholding summary judgment; the cases were
misapplied. The Smith court held that the party asserting
impossibility had the burden of proving fulfillment was
impossible, and that a party would not be excused from its
obligations based on poor contract planning.8' In 360 Ranch, the
court held that grants of summary judgment should rarely be
given by district courts in cases involving impossibility of
performance, and remanded for further findings regarding the
impossibility of compliance.8 2 Opera was remanded to establish
whether an unexpected supervening event occurred, whether the
74. Id. at 627.
75. Id. at 628.
76. Id. at 624.
77. Id.
78. Bissell at 624.
79. Id. at 622.
80. Id. at 626.
81. Smith, 173 Mont. at 370, 567 P.2d at 928.
82. 360 Ranch, 926 P.2d at 263.
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event was of such a nature that its non-occurrence was a basic
assumption when the parties contracted, and whether the
occurrence of the event rendered performance impracticable.
The court in Bissell held a supervening event, unforeseeable to
the plaintiff, rendered performance of the contract impossible.
Cape-France argued that drilling a pump test well 83 would
create a "huge risk" to the business and the public at large. As
the party claiming the defense, Cape-France had the duty to
demonstrate the veracity of its assertion with expert testimony.
They did not offer any. They relied only on the letter from the
DEQ. The DEQ's letter simply said that it was aware of PCE in
the area, which Cape-France knew when it signed the
Agreement.8 4 The letter also stated that the DEQ did not know
the extent of the spreading of the plume, and that water supply
wells8 5  drilled in the proposed subdivision "may tap
contaminated groundwater or become contaminated over time
with pumping."86
The function of a pump test well is vastly different from
that of a water supply well. A water supply well is just that: a
well used for daily water supply. A pump test well is drilled to
supply one clean liter of water to the DEQ for accurate testing of
contaminants.8 7 In order to subdivide, Cape-France needed to
establish the existence of a water supply on the property. After
subdivision, according to the Agreement, the property would
have been under the control of Peed and Moore.88 Peed and
Moore consulted the Bozeman Master Plan and were aware the
city intended to extend its municipal water supply to the
property.8 9 Indeed, municipal water was available at the time of
the appeal, rendering moot the environmental degradation
possibly associated with a water supply well.
83. Telephone Interview with Pat Crowley, Hydrogeologist, Montana DEQ (Mar.
19, 2002). Mr. Crowley explained that a pump test well needs to provide only one liter of
clean water to permit accurate testing. He did add that the well must be "pumped and
surged" for approximately one hour before the initial test to clear the well of debris. He
estimated that an average well, pumping 12 gallons per minute, would expel
approximately 720 gallons in that hour before the clean liter would be obtained.
84. Appellants' Initial Br., Ex.7.
85. Telephone Interview with Ryan Leeland, Environmental Engineer, Montana
DEQ (Mar. 22, 2002). Mr. Leeland explained that a water supply well differs vastly from
a pump test well in the quantity of gallons per minute pumped.
86. Appellants' Initial Br., Ex.4.
87. See, Telephone Interview with Ryan Leeland, supra note 82.
88. Resp't Br. at 2.
89. Telephone Interview with Marthe Moore Elliott, Appellant, Tonopah, Nevada
(Mar. 21, 2002).
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Cape-France was not told by the DEQ that there was a huge
risk. The DEQ did not quantify the risk at all in the letter, nor
did Cape-France ask the DEQ or any other expert to quantify
the risk. Cape-France only asserted there was a huge risk in
drilling a pump test well, just like the miners in Smith asserted
there was not enough gold. The court should have made the
same conclusion: fulfill the contract, unless it can be shown by
expert testimony that the risk of pumping one liter of water is
large enough to make fulfillment impossible.
Lacking such testimony, the court should have followed the
remainder of the holding in Smith, and awarded damages to
Peed and Moore. In Smith, the plaintiffs had sought forfeiture
of the mine from defendants, and reversion of the property to
themselves for defendants' breach and failure to pay. The court
in Smith applied Montana Rules of Civil Procedure 54(c) to
provide the plaintiffs with proper relief, which it determined to
be the value of the royalties owed, plus interest for the years
defendants did not mine the required 300 yards of material each
working day. 90
Peed and Moore were damaged when they did not acquire
the rights to the parcel because Cape-France failed to get it
subdivided. Had Cape-France not breached its duty to subdivide
the land, Peed and Moore would have owned the five-acre parcel.
Due to the breach, if the court refused to offer specific
performance, proper relief would have been the current value of
the property of the time of the decision, which was
approximately two million dollars. 91 Instead the court went
against precedent, and misapplied Smith.
The entire discussion of constitutionality and the expansion
of impossibility to include impracticability should have been
avoided. If the court had based its decision on established
precedent it would have remanded the case for further findings,
because the lower court improperly found an absence of genuine
issues of material fact.
The court had precedent directly on point in 360 Ranch,
90. Smith, 173 Mont. at 370, 567 P.2d at 930.
91. Telephone Interview with John C. Doubek, Attorney for Appellants, and
Telephone Interview with Marthe Moore Elliott, Appellant (Mar. 22, 2002). The parties
had to agree to arbitration as a condition of filing for appeal to the Supreme Court. In
arbitration, which is not reviewed by the Court, Appellant and Appellant's attorney
allege that Cape-France offered to subdivide and sell the land for $2.6 million, and that
Appellant countered for $2 million and was refused. Both Appellant and her Counsel
believe the steep increase in the value of the land in question, after the construction on
the 19th Street interchange began, was the motivating factor in Cape-France's motion.
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when it held that a district court would rarely be in the position
to properly grant summary judgment on a claim of breach
excused by impossibility. The Cape-France court was not
required to accept the lower court's finding of a lack of genuine
issues of material fact. The lower court's confusion regarding
two key issues of material fact should have caused the Montana
Supreme Court to remand for further findings.
The lower court found that Cape-France was aware of the
plume's existence and its movement towards Cape-France's
property. 92  At the same time, the lower court found the
contamination was new, unexpected and unknown to Cape-
France.93 Further findings needed to be made concerning to
what extent Cape-France knew of the plume, and to what extent
that knowledge made it liable for breach of the contract terms.
The lower court misperceived the DEQ's letter, believing it
informed Cape-France that its property was located in an area of
groundwater contamination. But in fact, the DEQ stated only
that the extent of the contamination was unknown. The
Montana Supreme Court should have found the lower court's
holding of impossibility improper because of the limited
information the lower court had.
Indeed, remanding Cape-France subject to resolution based
on facts would have been more true to the holding of Opera as
well. Furthermore, if the Fourth Circuit's concerns in Opera
were applied to Cape-France, the court could not have found for
the plaintiffs on the basis of impracticability. Cape-France is an
experienced land-developer, and as such was aware of the use of
indemnification clauses. Cape-France knew about the
contamination plume. No supervening event occurred. The
court should have enforced specific performance or granted relief
per Montana Rules of Civil Procedure 54(c) as in Smith.
Finally, applying the logic of Bissell to Cape-France, the
court should have found for Peed and Moore because no
supervening event existed. Cape-France could not show an event
took place after the formation of the contract that altered its
ability to satisfy its contractual obligations. Its knowledge of the
plume existed before the contract was signed. Its lack of
forethought in not contracting for an appropriate indemnity
provision should not have been grounds for rescinding the
Agreement or for overturning precedent. The Cape-France court
92. Appellants' Initial Br., Ex.1 at 6.
93. Id. at 7.
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did not apply the doctrine of supervening impracticability
creating impossibility correctly.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bozeman extended the municipal water supply to the
property before the appeal, making potential environmental
degradation moot. The court should have remanded for a
finding based on substantially changed circumstances.
However, even if the water supply had not been established, the
court should have remanded for further findings based on the
doctrine of stare decisis. Precedent in Montana strongly
discourages a district court from granting summary judgment
based on grounds of impossibility, and Cape-France is a good
example to justify continued practice of the holding laid out in
360 Ranch.
The lower court should not have been upheld when it
simultaneously found Cape-France knew about the plume and
its movement but found the contamination as new, unexpected,
and unknown. The lower court also found that the property in
question was located in a contaminated area, when the DEQ
said the extent of contamination was unknown. Furthermore,
scientific data was not submitted to the lower court to
substantiate the claims of Cape-France. These statements
demonstrate genuine issues of material fact, precluding
summary judgment.
If the Montana Supreme Court had followed precedent and
remanded, the lower court would have heard the science behind
the claims of risk to the environment from drilling a pump test
well. Then, if the case had been reappealed, the court would
have had the hard science necessary to formulate solid
conclusions concerning violations of the right to a clean and
healthful environment.
The court prematurely addressed constitutional issues,
breaking with its own wisdom. It did not qualify environmental
degradation, nor did it provide direction concerning the balance
of the right to a clean and healthful environment against
permissible degradation related to economic and social
developments. In MEIC, the court endorsed the water quality
statute which balances degradation of water against the benefit
of economic and social developments. Peed and Moore planned
to construct a hotel, a project that would result in economic
development. The court's decision not to remand deprived Peed
and Moore of their right to acquire and possess property.
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Cape-France does not provide Montanans with clear factors
the court will use to decide future cases involving private
property issues and the right to a clean and healthful
environment. A scientifically unsubstantiated assertion of
environmental degradation led to the rescission of the
Agreement. The decision murkied the waters of a clear pool of
established precedent.
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